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Aggregating Probabilities across Offences in Criminal Law
(First Draft – February 17, 2008)
Alon Harel & Ariel Porat*
A defendant is charged with four offences, allegedly committed in four
different times and places. The probability that he committed each one of
the offences is 90%. Assume that the minimum threshold required for conviction is
95%. Under prevailing criminal law the defendant would be acquitted of all
four charges since no offence can be attributed to him. However, a simple calculation
reveals that the probability that the defendant committed no offence at all is .01%
only! Consequently it seems that convicting the person for at least one offence without
specifying what this offence is would be just and efficient.
We argue that in such cases, and under certain conditions, efficient deterrence will be
better achieved if courts would aggregate probabilities across different
offences, and would be willing to convict defendants even for unspecified
offences. We also show under what conditions aggregating probabilities will
yield less, rather than more, convictions.
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Introduction
The question we address in this paper is whether when a defendant is accused
of several offences, the court (or the jury) should examine each charge separately and
decide whether the standard of "beyond reasonable doubt" was satisfied with regard
to each of them, or instead examine all charges in aggregate and decide whether the
standard of "beyond reasonable doubt" is satisfied with respect to at least one of them.
We call the former principle: the "Distinct Probabilities Principle" (DPP) and the
latter principle the "Aggregate Probabilities Principle" (APP). Example 1 illustrates
the pros and cons of using the APP.
Example 1. Sexual Assault. A person is charged with four offences of sexual
assault committed in different times and places against different women. The
evidence suggests that the probability that the person committed each one of
these offences is .9. There is no interdependence among the probabilities
attached to the commission of each offence. Assume that the required
probability necessary to satisfy the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard in
our legal system is .95.1 Should the court convict the defendant on any
offence?
Examined separately, that is, in accordance with the DPP, the defendant ought
to be acquitted of all four offences. Yet it is also easy to see that the probability that
the person committed at least one of these offences is much higher than the
probability necessary for conviction in a criminal trial! In fact that probability is
.9999!2 Furthermore the probability that he committed at least 2 offences is still
higher than .95.3 Consequently, it does not seem unjust to follow the APP and convict
1

This assumption does not require us to presuppose that the standard of "beyond reasonable
doubt" is only probabilistic. We may assume that a certain amount of individualized evidence,
relating to the defendant's conduct is a pre-requisite for conviction. For using the .95 threshold
as an illustration of the probabilistic nature of the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard, see
Kaye, at 40.

2

Here is the calculation: the probability that the person committed each one of the offences is .9,
and therefore the probability that he did not commit each one of them is 1-.9 =.1. Consequently
the probability that he did not commit any offences is (.1)4=.0001, and the probability that he
committed at least one of the offences is 1-.0001 = .9999.

3

This is the outcome of a binomial distribution. There are 4 events, and in each one the defendant
either committed the offence or not (thus he either committed 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 offences, and the
probability that one of these scenarios happened is 1). To calculate the probability that the
defendant committed at least 2 offences out of the 4, the probability that he committed 0
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him of two offences (or of at least one offence). Note that even if the defendant was
charged with two instead of four offences, aggregating the probabilities would yield a
probability of .99 that the defendant committed at least one offence, and applying the
APP would guarantee conviction.
The dilemma faced by the legal system is straightforward. If the person in
Example 1 is not convicted of any of the offences, it follows that he is acquitted
despite the fact that the probability that he committed at least two offences is higher
than the probability required for conviction. Individuals however are routinely
convicted for committing single offences on the basis of much weaker evidence. Yet,
at the same time, by using this probabilistic calculation and applying the APP, the
person cannot be convicted of any specific offence. All the evidence establishes is that
he committed "beyond reasonable doubt" at least two offences out of the four offences
which he is being charged with. There is no evidence sufficient for conviction that any
particular offence was committed by him. Is it just or efficient to acquit the person in
such a case and, at the same time, convict another person who is charged with an
identical single offence with a much lower probability of .95? Or should he instead be
convicted of committing two offences (or one offence) despite the fact that the judge
cannot specify what these offences are?
Example 1 illustrates how aggregating the probabilities of all charges (in
accordance with the APP) results in more convictions than if each charge is examined
separately (in accordance with the DPP). The next example illustrates how
aggregating probabilities could result in fewer convictions.

offences or 1 offence should be subtracted from 1. Since the probability that the defendant did
not commit any offence is (.1)4=.0001, and the probability that he committed exactly one
offence is (.9)*(.1)3*4=.0036 (".9" is the probability that he committed one specific offence;
"(.1)3" is the probability that he did not commit any of the other 3 offences; and the
multiplication by"4" is because the specific offence committed by the defendant could be any of
the 4 offences), the probability that he committed at least 2 offences is 1-.0001-.0036=.9963. To
calculate the probability that the defendant committed at least 3 offences the probability that he
committed 4 offences should be added to the probability that that he committed 3 offences.
Since the probability that the defendant committed 4 offences is (.9)4 and the probability that he
committed 3 offences is (.9)3*.1*4, the probability that he committed at least 3 offences is .6561
+ .2916 = .9477.
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Example 2. Sexual Assault: Fewer convictions. A person is charged with four
identical offences of sexual assault committed in different times and places
against different women. The evidence provided to the court suggests that the
probability that the person committed each one of these offences is .95. There
is no interdependence between the probabilities attached to the commission
of each offence. Assume that the required probability necessary to satisfy the
"beyond reasonable doubt" standard in our legal system is 0.95. Should the
court convict the defendant in all offences?
Examined separately, the defendant ought to be convicted of all four offences.
Yet it is easy to see that the probability that the defendant committed all four offences
is much lower than .95. In fact that probability is around .81!4 The judge in this case is
faced therefore with a hard choice. If she convicts the person of three offences
(without specifying what these offences are) the probability that the defendant
committed three offences is higher than .95 (it is .986) and thus satisfies the evidential
requirements of a criminal trial. At the same time the judge cannot specify what the
offences the person is convicted of are. Instead, she simply asserts that the probability
that the person committed three offences out of the four is high enough to justify
conviction. But convicting the person of four offences would guarantee that the
person is convicted for an offence where the likelihood he committed it is lower than
.95. Convicting the person for the four offences would almost inevitably result in
convicting him for an offence he has not committed.
Surprisingly, the possibility of applying the APP in criminal law across
different offences is yet unexplored.5 Even more surprisingly, to the best of our

4

(.95)4 = .814.

5

In other fields however the APP was considered and discussed at length. Thus, for instance,
aggregating probabilities in civil cases, was suggested by legal writers. See, e.g., Saul Levmore,
Michigan L. Rev.; Alex Stein Texas L. Rev. Furthermore, in an insightful paper published more
than a decade ago, Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser proposed aggregating
probabilities across cases outside the judicial context. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer and Richard
Zeckhauser, Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions 25 Journal of Legal Studies 27, 41-51
(1996). The authors argued that if, for example, a school considers dismissing a teacher, it
would make sense for the school to dismiss the teacher in case several complaints for sexual
harassments were made against him in the past, even if each complaint, considered separately,
does not provide sufficient reason for dismissal. The authors assumed, however, that such an
argument is inapplicable to criminal proceedings. Id, at 45-46 ("Of course, the practice of
noncumulation of charges in the criminal law serves important goals… Obviously there are
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knowledge, the APP has never been discussed in case law by judges and we do not
know of any case where a prosecutor has argued in court for its implementation. It
seems that lawyers as well as theorists take it for granted that a person can only be
convicted for performing a particular identifiable crime.
In this paper we challenge this conventional wisdom and argue that using the
APP in criminal proceedings may be justified under certain circumstances both for
retributive justice considerations and for deterrence-based considerations. The focus
of this paper is on the cases where applying the APP will result in more, rather than
fewer, convictions. Our practical suggestion is that in such cases, as a first step, courts
should apply the APP with special caution and to impose limits aimed to guarantee
that it would not be abused.
The paper is organized as follows. Part I introduces the APP and the virtues
and vices of using it. In Part II we distinguish the APP from previous doctrines
concerning probabilistic issues in both criminal and tort law as well as from similar
doctrines recognized by legal theorists and practitioners. Part III considers the APP
from a deterrence-based perspective and indicates its potential of reducing the level of
error in fact-finding as well as reducing enforcement costs. Part IV discusses several
practical objections to the APP, the most important of which is its possible abuse by
the enforcement agencies (police and prosecution). This part shows that none of the
objections is compelling enough to justify the rejection of the APP altogether
although some of these objections justify greater caution in applying it. In Part V we
discuss the APP from a justice-based perspective. We establish that while
retributivists may be inclined to inflict sanctions for an offence committed by a person
irrespective of what this offence is (and consequently adopt the APP) expressivists
may insist that the infliction of sanctions may be justified only if it is established that
a person committed a specific well-defined offence (and consequently adopt the DPP).

I Introducing the Aggregate Probabilities Principle
The evidence required for convicting a person in a criminal trial must be
evidence which is "beyond reasonable doubt." The rationale of this requirement and

costs associated with theses goals… but weighing the costs and benefits of the refusal to
cumulate in the criminal process is not our goal").
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its precise meaning is of course controversial.6 Yet it is beyond doubt that the standard
of "beyond reasonable doubt" has an important probabilistic aspect to it.7 The

6

See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt
about Reasonable Doubt, 78 Texas L. Rev (2000) ("Most debate in judicial opinions and in the
scholarly literature has focused on whether reasonable doubt should be defined for the jury, and,
if so, how it should be defined"."); Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition,
108 Harvard L. Rev. (1995) (concluding that "courts should not attempt to define the term
[reasonable doubt] in conveying the reasonable doubt concept to juries"); Jessica N. Cohen, The
Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving Meaning to a Critical Concept, 22 American
Journal of Criminal Law 677, 678 (1995) (arguing that "because reasonable doubt is a term of
art it should be defined for the jury"); Henry A. Diamond, Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define,
or Not to Define, 90 Columbia L. Rev 1716 (1990) ("[J]ury instructions defining reasonable
doubt should always be given in criminal trials and are constitutionally required when requested
by the defendant or the jury."). See also Thomas V. Mulrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in the
World is it Defined?, 12 American University Journal of International Law and Policy (1997)
(explaining various approaches to and definitions of reasonable doubt).

7

Alex Stein, *** 65 ("Adjudicative fact-finding rests on probabilistic reasoning that derives from
experience"), and at 66, "Any finding that fact-finders make can only be probable, rather than
certain"). For the different views, see *** Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the
Land, 47 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO L. REV. 34, *** (1980) (""Physicists, engineers, economists,
geneticists, businessmen, actuaries, bookmakers, and casino operators prove, day in and day out,
that the mathematical theory provides more useful and more accurate predictions of important
phenomena than any alternative methods. Surely the probability axioms work sufficiently well
for objectively estimated probabilities. Why should they not serve as well when applied to
thoughtful, subjective estimates?"); *** Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences:
The Value of Complexity, 92 Harvard L. Rev. 1187, *** (1979) (concluding that "any
conceptualization of reasonable doubt in probabilistic form is inconsistent with the functional
role the concept is designed to play."); *** Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in
the Legal Process, 84 Harvard L. Rev. 489, *** (1970) (offering a variety of practical reasons to
suggest that probabilities calculated according to Bayes's statistical formula would not be as
accurate or useful as they might appear at first sight, and pointing out how values other than the
accuracy of fact-finding might be undermined by the explicit use of probability calculations,
especially in criminal cases; Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Verdical Verdicts:
Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods,
75 Cornell L. Rev. 247, 252 (1990) ("All evidence is probabilistic, in the sense that there is a
risk of error in relying on in to support a factual conclusion about a case"); Jonathan Cohen
(***).
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evidence supporting a conviction in a criminal trial ought to establish that the
defendant committed an offence with a high degree of probability.8
It is implicitly assumed by the criminal law system that in order to convict a
person for the commission of an offence, the standard of "beyond reasonable doubt"
should be satisfied with respect to each offence, that is., separately and distinctively
from other offences.9 To the best of our knowledge no one has ever doubted this
principle, which we label the Distinct Probabilistic Principle (DPP). The proposed
principle we offer in this paper—the Aggregate Probabilities Principle (APP)—
challenges the DPP: why not convict a person for an offence when it is certain, or
almost certain, that that person committed an offence, even if it cannot be established
which offence it was. Why not convict the defendant in Example 1 for at least one
offence of sexual assault when the probability that he committed no offence at all is
one to ten thousand? To reduce the risk of excessive punishment, a supporter of the
APP would argue, the defendant in example 1 should be convicted at a minimum for
the least serious of the four offences, and be punished accordingly.
Note that the APP works not only against defendants but also in their favor.
Example 2 is illustrative: a defendant who is accused of four offences of sexual
assault where each—if examined separately—can be proven beyond reasonable doubt
should not be convicted under the APP for all four offences, but only for three.10
8

For those readers who are skeptical about mathematical calculations in the legal context we
suggest to think of the same problem without resorting to probabilities: should a court convict a
defendant when there is no reasonable doubt that he committed at least one offence, but it
cannot be established which offence out of several offences was committed by him? See
Jonathan Cohen (***); Tribe (***).

9

The prior acts doctrine could be regarded as an exception, but as will be explained infra, this
doctrine is completely different from the APP. In particular, under the prior acts doctrine, the
prior acts of the defendant indicate that the probability that he committed the offence he is
charged with is higher than what the court would have determined absent the prior acts doctrine.
In contrast, under the APP, once the probabilities of the commission of several offences are
established, those probabilities are aggregated and may lead to conviction for an offence which
is unspecified.
The other exception is the German legal system which recognizes under certain circumstances
that a person can be convicted of an unspecified offence. Yet this exception is much narrower in
its scope than the rule proposed by us. For a description of the German system, see

10

This is not to say, however, that the APP is overall neutral with respect to defendants.
Admittedly, the APP is expected to bring to more convictions than to more acquittals. The
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In theory the APP could be applied to any case where a defendant is charged
with more than one offence. We draw now some intuitive distinctions between
different cases and in the following parts we return to these distinctions and show how
they may have normative significance in shaping the APP.
First it is intuitive to distinguish cases in which a person is charged with
identical offences from cases in which a person is charged with different offences
("the nature of the offence criterion"). As we demonstrate later on, expressivist
theorists of punishment would find it more acceptable to convict a person for sexual
assault when there are four charges against him on that matter even if none of the
charges, examined separately, can be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Those
theorists would find it much harder to convict a person who committed either theft, or
fraud or murder when none of these offences can be proven beyond reasonable doubt
even if it is evident that the person committed one of these offences.
Second, even if the offences are identical, it would be easier to accept a
conviction of a person of what we label “homogenous offences,” namely offences
whose nature and severity depends less on the particular circumstances than to accept
a conviction of a person of “heterogeneous offences” ("the homogeneity criterion").
The severity of theft or fraud may depend on numerous contextual considerations,
while violating the speed limit is typically less sensitive to the circumstances.
Third, in some cases the relevant offenses are directed at the same victim,
while, in other cases, the offenses are directed at different victims ("the same victim
criterion"). Thus, there could be a difference between applying the APP to a case
when an employer is accused of four acts of sexual assault directed towards a specific
employee, and applying it to a case when a defendant is accused of four such acts
directed towards different victims. This difference could cut both ways: on one hand it
could be more acceptable to convict a person for an unspecified offence if it can be
proven beyond reasonable doubt that the offence was committed against a single
victim than if the offence was committed against different victims. Some of the
intuition for this is that the APP, by taking into account all probabilities from 1% to 94%
(assuming 95% is the threshold for conviction) increases the number of convictions, and only by
taking into account probabilities from 95% to 99% reduces the number of convictions. This
asymmetry by itself can explain why the APP is expected to bring in total to many more
convictions than what we presently have under the DPP. Later we offer more reasons that
reinforces this conclusion. Infra.

9
retributive and communicative theories are expected to support such an argument. On
the other hand, when the victim of all offences is the same one, the risk that the
offences are interdependent is higher. As we elaborate further on, interdependency
could be a significant obstacle for the application of the APP.
Fourth, when we move from the core offences of criminal law to regulatory
violations, the use of the APP seems more reasonable. Thus, being detected four times
for driving beyond the speed limit by a police radar seems to pose a stronger case for
applying the APP than committing four thefts. Besides typically satisfying the
homogeneity criterion, traffic offences are regulatory offences. Regulatory offences
are governed primarily by considerations of deterrence and justice-based
considerations are less applicable with respect to them ("the regulatory offence
criterion").
Fifth, there is an intuitive difference between a case when a person is charged
with all offences simultaneously and a case when a person is charged with a new
offence after he had been previously convicted or acquitted of previous offences ("the
same trial criterion"). Compare example 1, where a person is charged simultaneously
with four offences and the evidence suggests that the probability that he committed
each of these offences is .9, with a case in which a person has been acquitted three
times in the past because the probability that he committed one of these past offences
is merely .9. Similarly compare example 2 where a person is charged with four
offences each of which can be proven with a probability of .95 with a case in which a
person was convicted three times in the past because the evidence indicated with a
probability of .95 in each case that he had committed the offence. The reasoning of
the judge in the fourth case could either adopt the DPP or the APP. Somewhat
counter-intuitively, applying the APP yields higher chances of conviction for a person
who was acquitted in the past and lower chances of conviction for a person who was
convicted in the past. Yet the case for applying the APP for different trials, rather than
for different charges in the same trial, seems to be weaker.11

11

The case for applying the APP in different trials is weaker for several reasons: first, the
information obstacles in applying the APP across trials are more serious than across charges in
the same trial. Second it seems to violate the implicit principles that trials are separate and that
the outcome of one trial ought not to influence the outcome of other trials for other offences.

10
Finally, The APP is not limited to cases when the product of the aggregated
probabilities is less than 100%: it also could apply to cases when there is no doubt
whatsoever that the defendant committed an offence, even though it cannot be
established which offence it was. An example given by Leo Katz is illustrative.
Suppose a murder and a burglary were committed at the same time in two different
places and a hidden camera recorded both events. Unfortunately the perpetrators of
these crimes are twin brothers. It is known therefore that each of the two brothers
committed one of the offences. It is unknown however which was committed by
whom.12 Under the APP both brothers should be convicted for the lesser of the two
crimes, namely burglary.

II The Aggregate Probabilities Principle in Context
A. Aggregating Probabilities in Prevailing Law
Aggregating probabilities is not unfamiliar to the legal system. The question
of aggregating probabilities manifests itself in fact-finding procedures when a court or
a jury must determine whether a conjunction of facts or events took place. With
respect to each of the facts or events composing the set there is a specific probability
that it took place, and the probability that all facts or events, or alternatively, at least
one of them, took place is an aggregation of all relevant probabilities. Thus, suppose a
judge in a civil case must decide whether the defendant was negligent and whether he
caused the injury, and, only if both questions are answered affirmatively is liability
imposed. Assume now that the judge estimates that the probability that the defendant's
was negligent is .6, and the probability that given his negligence he caused the injury,
is also .6. Aggregating the probabilities in this case yields a probability of .36 that the
defendant was both negligent and caused the injury (hereinafter: "the civil cumulative
case"). If the decision is based on aggregating the different probabilities of the two
components of the wrongdoing, the plaintiff should lose since the probability that both
components were satisfied is only .36. However, if each component of the cause of
action—negligence and causation—is examined separately, the plaintiff would win

12

Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains: evasion, blackmail, fraud, and kindred puzzles of the law, 67-69.
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the case. Theorists disagree whether an aggregation of probabilities rule should be
applied and it seems that case law rejects it.13
Similarly, when the defendant is liable either if scenario A took place or if
scenario B took place (for example, each scenario establishes that the defendant both
was negligent toward the victim and caused him the injury), the probability with
respect to each scenario is .3 and those probabilities are independent of each other,
then the probability that at least one of the scenarios took place is .51 (hereinafter,
"the civil alternative case").14 Once again, aggregating the probabilities would

13

See Saul Levmore, Conjunctions and Aggregation, 99 MICHIGAN L. REV. 723 (2000-1)
(Arguing that no jurisdiction explicitly recognizes the product rule—which is the rule that
mandates the aggregation of the probabilities (id. at 752, note 58); and explaining that such nonrecognition could be warranted mainly in those cases where decisions are made by both jury or
other multimember panels, either unanimously or by supermajority).
Some theorists argue that not allowing the product rule creates "the conjunction paradox": See
Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and Their
Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEXAS L. REVIEW 1203-1205 (2001) (***). Allowing the
product rule is supported by Maya Bar-Hillel, Probabilistic Analysis in Legal Factfinding, 56
ACTA PSYCHOLOGIA 267 (1984); David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land,
47 UNIVERSITY

OF

CHICAGO L. REV. 34 (1979); Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux,

Probability – The Logic of the Law, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 457 (1993). Disallowing it is
supported by Ferdinand Schoeman, Cohen on Inductive Probability and the Law of Evidence, 54
PHI. SCI. 76, 80-82 (1098). Stein, id, identifies the distortion that could be created by
disallowing the product rule if examined separately, but argues that taken together with another
major distortion in fact-finding, a second best solution is achieved.
See also Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 Iowa L.
Rev. 577 (1987). For the different views see George Bundy Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The
Admission of DNA Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 2465 (1997)
(saying "[T]he preferred method for estimating the probability of matching bands in a random
sample of DNA profiling is referred to as the 'product rule' method", at 2474); Sue Rosenthal,
My Brother's Keeper: A Challenge to the Probative Value of DNA Fingerprinting, 23 American
Journal of Criminal Law 195 (1996), at 200.
14

The probability that none of the events took place is .7 x .7 = .49. The probability that at least
one of them took place is 1 – .49 = .51. If the scenarios exclude each other than the probability
that at least one took place is .3 + .3 = .6. For an analogical example see Stein, supra note, at
85, (discussing "The Two Witnesses Paradox" according to which two unreliable witnesses—
namely, each testimony is assumed to have less than .5 probability of being true—are brought
by the claimant and gives identical testimonial accounts, independently of each other. Since

12
generate a different decision than if each probability were to be considered
separately.15 Generally, also here, courts do not explicitly recognize the aggregation
of the probabilities rule.16 However, there are important exceptions to this general
rule. In tort, for instance, proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant's wrongful act caused the injury would normally be sufficient for courts to
impose liability, even if the plaintiff cannot prove by the preponderance of the
evidence what exactly made the defendant's act wrongful.17
Finally, aggregating probabilities can also be relevant to criminal cases. When
establishing the defendant's guilt requires the presence of several components of the
offense, aggregating the probabilities of the separate components is important. It can
be the case that even if each component of the offense can be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt there would be a reasonable doubt with respect to the cumulative
existence of all components (hereinafter, "the criminal cumulative case"). Will the
court convict the defendant under such circumstances? The answer to this question is
unclear.18

both witnesses are unreliable, their independent corroboration lowers, rather than increase the
probability that the claimant's claim is founded).
15

See Levmore, supra note, at 729, note 11, and 745-6 (explaining this "alternative Routes"
scenario, and titling this issue "reverse conjunction"). Levmore applies his explanation for the
non recognition of the product rule, supra note, also to this scenario. Levmore, Id.

16

Levmore, supra note, at 729, note 11; Tribe, supra note, at 1361, claims that hard statistical data
leads decisionmakers to "dwarf the soft variables" and to assume that "[i]f you can't count it, it
doesn't exist" (for different view see Koehler & Shviro, supra note, at 265).

17

Cite. Check: Prosser, Torts; Dobbs, Torts; Restatement 2d, Torts; and Draft of Restatement 3d ,
Torts.

18

See Levmore, at 729 (presenting a possible application of the product rule to criminal cases) and
733, note 19 (suggesting that the defense might enjoy the product rule when it reminds the jury
of all the doubts that have been raised and imply that they combine to leave more than a
reasonable doubt). See also Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol
Paradigm for Multimembers Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 138 (discussing the product rule in
the context of voting by judges in a panel or by jurors and observing that "Although a criminal
defendant cannot be convicted unless a jury unanimously finds each element of the crime
charged proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 'a federal jury need not always decide unanimously
which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say, which
of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime.'" (footnotes
omitted).
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The case discussed in this paper is different from both the civil and criminal
cumulative cases. These cases deal with the question of when a court ought to convict
a person for a particular specified offence or to impose liability for a particular
specified wrong. The aggregation of the probabilities is designed to determine
whether a person committed the offence or the wrong. If the court imposes liability on
the defendant or convicts him, it implies that the court is satisfied that the evidence is
sufficient to justify the imposition of liability for a particular act. If the court fails to
impose liability, it implies that the court is not satisfied that the evidence is sufficient
to justify the imposition of liability for a particular wrong or for conviction in a
particular offence. In contrast, the concern of this paper is to examine cases in which
no specific offence can be attributed to the defendant. It is evident (or at least
sufficiently probable) that the defendant committed an offence (or several offences)
but it is unclear what this offence is.
The civil alternative case discussed above is more relevant to our inquiry. In
both the civil alternative case and in our case aggregating the probabilities and basing
liability (or guilt) on such aggregation results in the imposition of liability on a person
even if it cannot be established (under the relevant standard of proof) what the
misdeed he committed was. In tort, not knowing what exactly all the detailed facts
concerning the wrongful act are does not preclude the attribution of liability. Thus if a
car hits a pedestrian and all or most possible explanations for the accident indicate
that the driver's fault was the cause of the accident, liability will be imposed
regardless of whether we know what the fault of the driver was.19 But those cases are
different than the criminal cases we focus on in this paper: while in the latter cases the
indeterminacy relates to completely different misdeeds, in the former cases the
indeterminacy relates to different components of the same misdeed.
A tort law doctrine which comes closest to the APP is the doctrine of market
share liability (MSL). This doctrine was applied by some courts to the DES cases.
DES, a drug designed to prevent miscarriages, was manufactured by hundreds of
companies mainly in the fifties, turned out to be latently carcinogenic to female
foetuses. Twenty-five years later, many of the women whose mothers took the drug
have been diagnosed with uterine cancer. It was established by the court that the drug
was not tested properly prior to its marketing and that the manufacturers failed to take
19

Cite cases.
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into account certain findings that had pointed to the risk of cancer. Furthermore, the
plaintiffs’ mothers were never cautioned against this potential risk. Finally, the drug
was marketed under its generic rather than brand name, which has foiled the attempt
to trace each pill back to its actual manufacturer.20 Unfortunately, most of the
plaintiffs could not link the specific pills their mothers took to a specific
manufacturer. To provide a remedy to the victims, the courts developed the MSL
doctrine. Under this doctrine, first adopted by the Supreme Court of California at the
Sindell Case,21 each of the defendants would be held liable for the plaintiff’s damage
unless each successfully proves that he did not manufacture the drug taken by the
plaintiff’s mother. As further clarified by the court in Sindell, this liability would be
imposed only on those manufacturers who produced a substantial proportion of the
DES drugs in the relevant market. The Sindell court ultimately decided that the
burden of compensating each plaintiff for her damage would be allocated between the
manufacturers in accordance with their respective shares in the DES market.22
This is a doctrine which allows the aggregation of probabilities. To establish
why, imagine that there are ten manufacturers in the market which wrongfully (but
separately) produced and marketed an identical hazardous product (like the DES) to
consumers thereby causing identical injuries to a thousand people. Also assume that
all manufacturers have identical shares in the market and that it is completely
impossible to trace any injury to any specific manufacturer. In a single case brought
by one plaintiff, the probability that any single manufacturer caused the injury is 10%,
which is much below the threshold required for imposing liability. However, the
probability that a single manufacturer caused at least 10% of the total harm, namely
the sum of harms caused to all victims, is very high, more than enough to justify the
20

See Sindell v. Abbott, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
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Sindell v. Abbott,; Collins; Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984);
Hymovitz v. Eli Lilly Co., 539 N.E. 2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989). On the adoption of MSL in the
Netherlands, see J.G. Teulings, D.E.S. and Market Share Liability in the Netherlands, 110
L.Q.R. 228 (1994). On the rejection of the MSL in Ohio law, see Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 113
F. 3d 1426 (6th Cir. 1997).
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It is not clear whether this decision should be interpreted as imposing liability on each defendant
for all the plaintiff's damage (and then the allocation is achieved through indemnification claims
between the co-defendants) or as imposing liability on each defendant only for part of the
damage. For the second interpretation, see California in Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470,
485-87 (Cal. 1988).

15
imposition of liability. Indeed, at the end of the day, the MSL will make each
manufacturer in our example to bear exactly 10% of the total harm caused to the
victims. The MSL is therefore an analogous civil principle to the criminal principle of
the APP: both principles aggregate probabilities and impose liability accordingly.23
It should be noted however that MSL was applied almost only to cases with
identical conduct and identical risks created by all wrongdoers toward all victims.24
Most courts which were willing to apply the MSL to DES cases, refused to apply it in
the absence of this characteristic. The analogous criminal cases would therefore be
those where the criminal acts attributed to the defendants with various probabilities
are identical. At the same time, the MSL was applied to the DES cases even though
there were numerous victims and the probability of a single defendant causing injury
to a specific victim was rather small. Hence the MSL accepts the idea that defendants
may be found liable even though no specific harm to a specific plaintiff can be
attributed to them.
Extending criminal liability on the basis of tort law analogies requires
caution. Tort law and criminal law have different goals and the doctrines in each field
should be responsive to those goals. Aggregating probabilities could serve deterrence,
23

Both principles are different than the alternative liability principle established by the Supreme
Court of California in Summers v, Tice, which bears some superficial resemblance to the APP.
Summers v. Tice, 199 P. 2d 1 (1948). In this case three people participated in quail hunting. One
of them (the plaintiff) was shot in the eye by a stray bullet negligently fired by one of the other
hunters (the defendants). The defendants pulled their triggers simultaneously, so it could not be
determined whose bullet injured the plaintiff. The court resolved the case by establishing the
“alternative liability” principle, which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant “to absolve
himself, if he can.”(23) Defendants unable to evidentially disassociate themselves from the
damage are, therefore, held liable for the entire damage. This principle ultimately found its way
into the Second Restatement of Torts. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 433B & Ill. 9. But
again, this principle has nothing in common with aggregating probabilities we are dealing with
in this paper; the probability that each defendant in the Summers v. Tice case hit the defendant is
50%, and this probability is not the result of any aggregation. If one could think of any
aggregation done in such case, it is an aggregation on the plaintiff's—rather than on the
defendant's—side: the probability that the plaintiff suffered an injury from a wrongful shooting
is the sum of the probabilities that each defendant separately caused the injury. This sum yields
a probability of 1.
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and unsurprisingly the main support for the MSL comes from the concern to provide
potential tortfeasors with efficient incentives.25 Deterrence is believed to be an
important goal of criminal law; yet, unlike tort law, retributive considerations also
play a central role in this field.26 That could explain why aggregating probabilities
could be more compelling in tort law than in criminal law. We will discuss both
retribution and deterrence in section III and IV.
B. Similar Doctrines and Arguments
1. Prior Acts and Similar Crimes Doctrines
The APP maintains a close relationship to the "Prior Acts" and "Similar
Crimes" doctrines. Under the Prior Acts doctrine which was adopted by rule 404(b) of
the Federal Rule of Evidence,27 the prosecution can bring evidence of past crimes or
bad acts that can be attributed to the defendant in order to prove a narrow point
relating to the defendant's mental state, such as motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. This
evidence should not be used for proving the defendant's bad character, and courts are
required to instruct the jury accordingly.28

25

Porat & Stein, at 130-159. See also Mark A. Giestfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative
Liability and Market-Share Liability, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 447, 481 (2007) (explaining that
"[u]nder this method of apportionment, the interest of the DES plaintiff who has established a
right to receive compensation for the injury from the group of defendants exactly corresponds to
the interest of each individual defendant as a member of the causal group",).
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For a different view see Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of
Torts: A Descriptive Theory, 73 Tenn. L. Rev. 177 (2006) (arguing that retributive justice has a
certain influence on the development of tort law doctrines).
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Rule 404(b) prescribes: "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial." Check Woods, that was decided before the
enactment of 404 (B).
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See also People v. Quinn, 194 Mich. App. 250, 486 N.W.2d 139 (1992) (chastising prosecution
for arguing propensity based on evidence admitted under Rule 404(b)).
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The Similar Crimes doctrine, recognized by rules 413 and 414 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, applies to offences of sexual assault and child molestation. Under
this doctrine, if the defendant is accused of an offence of sexual assault or child
molestation, "evidence of the defendant's commission of another offence or offences
of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its
bearing on any other matter to which it is relevant."29
The similarity between those two doctrines on the one hand and the APP on
the other hand, emanates from a characteristic they have in common: all three
doctrines look at the past behavior of the defendant and that behavior influences the
chances of conviction.30
But there is a substantial difference between the APP and the other two
doctrines. The Prior Acts and Similar Crimes doctrines are founded on the conjecture
that a person who had committed several offences is either more likely to intend to
commit the offence he is presently accused of (the Prior Acts Doctrine) or is more
likely to have committed that present offence (the Similar Crimes Doctrine). It is the
interdependence between the other offence and the present offence attributed to the
defendant which justifies the doctrines. In contrast the APP is founded on the
assumption that there is no such interdependence between the different offences. It is
based on the conjecture that when there is a specific probability that a person
committed offence A and a certain probability that he committed offence B, and those

A federal court asked to admit other bad acts under Rule 404(b) need not make a preliminary
finding that the defendant committed these acts. The court need only determine that there is
sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the act
proffered under Rule 404(b). See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988)). Evidence
of other crimes is usually proffered in criminal procedures. Rule 404(b), however, contains no
such limitation, and potential civil applications occasionally arise. See Barnes v. City of
Cincinnati 401 F.3d 729 (6th Circ. 2005).
29

Under Rule 415 of the Federal Rule of Evidence, this doctrine is applicable also to civil cases
dealing with sexual assault and child molestation. For a critique of these rules, see Louis M.
Natali Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, "Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?": How Sexual
Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1 (1996) ("by
requiring the admission of propensity evidence, the rules prevent a fundamentally fair trail, and
thus violate due process…").

30

As Example 2 shows, sometimes the APP decreases chances of conviction. That could happen
also with the Prior Acts and Similar Crimes Doctrine.
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probabilities are not interdependent (or at least not fully interdependent), the
probability that he committed at least one of the offences is higher than the probability
that he committed A or the probability that he committed B.
Note, that under the Prior Acts and Similar Crimes doctrines the fact that a
person committed several similar offences in the past increases the chances that he
will be convicted in the present case. In contrast under the APP, as Example 2
illustrates, the fact that a person was convicted in committing several offences in the
past decreases the probability that he will be convicted in a later case. Unlike the Prior
Acts and Similar Crimes doctrines the APP dictates that the more a person was
convicted in the past, the higher the threshold required for a future conviction, and
vice versa.
2. Bentham's Proposal
The APP could be regarded as a variation on the famous Bentham’s argument
that the lower the probability of detection is, the higher the sanction ought to be.31
When detection is low, one of two routes should arguably be taken: either increasing
the sanction or reducing the threshold for conviction. The APP takes the latter route
while Bentham takes the former one.
In The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham argued that
when there is a suspicion that the same convicted person escaped detection by the law
in the past, the sanction should reflect this concern.32 Bentham maintains that in
setting the punishment, "it may be necessary, in some cases to take into account the
profit not only of the individual offence to which the punishment is to be annexed, but
also of such other offences of the same sort as the offender is likely to have already
committed without detection."33
One way to interpret Bentham's argument is analogous to the way we
understand the Prior Acts and Similar Crimes doctrine: while in the latter doctrine the
court infers from past behavior forward to the present charge, Bentham encourages
courts to infer from the present charge backward to past behavior. Under this
interpretation of Bentham's argument, increasing punishment for the present charge is
31

For the modern version of the argument, see Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 Journal of Political Economy (1968), at 169.
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We thank Avraham Tabbach for referring us to Bentham's on that issue.
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At p. 183.
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aimed at punishing the convicted person for past behavior which, in light of the
present conviction, can more easily be attributed to him.
Indeed, the APP, as Bentham's proposal indicates, is motivated by underenforcement of the law: if there had been no under-enforcement and it had been
always possible to fully and accurately detect all criminals, the APP would have been
meaningless. But as has already been explained the APP is based on the conjecture of
independence of the relevant probabilities while Bentham's suggestion is founded on
the precise opposite assumption, namely the assumption that if the person committed
one offence, it is more likely he has committed in the past other offences.

III The Case for the APP
Adopting the APP is expected to increase the number of errors in convicting
the innocent (false negative, or Type 2 errors) and decrease the number of errors in
acquitting the guilty (false positive, or Type 1 errors).34 It is beyond the scope of this
paper to examine the optimal allocation of errors in criminal cases.35 So let us assume
here, as we did before, that the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard implies a
probability threshold of .95 for conviction. Under this assumption the law prefers
having 18 guilty people—but not 19—set free than one innocent sit in jail.
Suppose now that we have a person accused of four identical offences, each
with probability of .9 for that person's guilt (see Example 1). Maintaining the same
threshold of 0.95 would mandate convicting the person with two offences in our
example. If the legal system acquits the person of all offences, it seems to endorse a
34

Type I error, or a false positive, is the risk that a study will reject the null hypothesis when it is
true; it is the risk that the study will reject a lack of association when in fact there is no
correlation. Type II, or a false negative, is the risk of failing to reject the null hypothesis when it
is false; it is the risk that the study will declare no association when there is an association. All
else being equal, one cannot decrease the risk of Type I error without simultaneously increasing
the risk of Type II error. Cf. Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, LAW AND ECONOMICS *** (2007)
(***).
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For differents ways to optimize type I and type II errors in law enforcement, see Polinsky and
Shavell, HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, Volume I, 427-9; I. P. L. Png, Optimal Subsidies
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principle under which it is better to have 9,999 guilty people acquitted than having
one innocent person convicted. To better understand the absurdity of this result,
imagine now that instead of four offences, the defendant in Example 1 was charged
with ten offences, all with probability of .9 to his guilt. Not convicting the defendant
in such a case of any offence would indicate a preference that 10 billion minus one
guilty people be acquitted in order to prevent the conviction of a single innocent
person.36 Besides of its absurdity, this result highlights the discriminatory effect of the
DPP as opposed to the APP: adhering to the DPP implies an unfair preference of
people accused of committing a series of offences as opposed to those accused of a
single offence. This is so, because the probability of guilt required to convict a person
of the former type is much higher than the probability of guilt required for convicting
a person of the latter type.
As we stated at the beginning of this section, the APP is expected to raise the
number of errors in convicting the innocent. But interestingly, under certain realistic
assumptions about the limits of resources allocated to law enforcement, it is possible
that the costs (as opposed to the number of errors) resulting from convicting the
innocent would be lower under the APP than under the DPP. Suppose there is a
constraint on the total amount of punishment the state can inflict on offenders, for
example, on the total number of years all offenders are sent to prison. Under such a
constraint, since the APP will result in more convictions, the average offender will be
sent to jail for shorter periods of time. But note that under such a constraint, offenders
who are charged with several offences will get on average more years in prison than
what they get now, and other offenders, namely those who are charged with one
offence, will get on average fewer years in prison than what they get now. If the
probability of error in finding guilt with respect to defendants of the former category
is lower than with respect to defendants of the latter category—which is very likely—
and since the costs of error in convicting the innocent is also a function of the years
the innocent is sent to jail, the shift from APP to ADD could decreases the total costs
of convicting the innocent.37
36

The probability that no offence was committed is (.1)10, and consequently the probability that at
least one offence was committed is 1-(.1)10.
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Most importantly, the APP is superior to the DPP on deterrence-based
grounds. In particular, the DPP has a negative effect on the deterrence of repeat
offenders. Under the DPP, repeat offenders' chances to escape conviction are much
higher than under the APP. This implies that their expected sanction under the DPP is
lower than under the APP and therefore there is greater deterrence under the latter
rule. Since there is almost a consensus among writers that the expected sanction
necessary to achieve optimal deterrence is higher for repeat offenders than for other
offenders,38 the APP is well founded on deterrence grounds.
the innocent); Henrik Lando, The Size of the Sanction Should Depend on the Weight of the
Evidence, 1 REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 278 (2005) (suggesting to vary sanctions with the
weight of evidence, and pointing out that this results in less unfairness to the innocents who are
wrongly convicted).
Our argument is analogical to a different argument made by theoreticians according to which it
is justified to punish repeat offenders more severely than other offenders, because the risk of
convicting the innocent is lower with repeat offenders than with other offenders. See C.Y. Cyrus
Chu, Sheng-cheng Hu, Ting-yuan Huang, Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely, 20
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repeat offenders is justified because the risk of convicting the innocent is lower with regard to
them).
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Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. R. (1985), at 1215 ("a repeat offender is
usually punished more severely than a first offender even if the repeat offender served in full
whatever sentences were imposed for the earlier crimes"); David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle
of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733 (2001) (arguing that declining
penalties for repeat offenders are optimal since the probability of detection escalates with
offence history); Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat
Offenders 46 J. PUB. ECON. 291 (1001) (arguing that when the penalty is a fine and when the illgotten gains of the offenders are not considered part of the social good, it is optimal to punish
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other offenders); Ariel Rubinstein, On an Anomaly of the Deterrent Effect of Punishment 6
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Arguably one could object and maintain that it is unlikely that offenders will
calibrate their criminal behavior differently under the APP and the DPP. Under this
objection, it is not probable that when offenders plan to commit a crime they are
sensitive to the amount of evidence the prosecution will be able to collect on the
present crime, on past and future crimes, and more importantly on the accumulation of
the evidence and its probative value in a future trial.39
This objection fails to consider the fact that repeat offenders are often
(although certainly not always) "professionals", while one-time offenders are often
(although certainly not always) amateurs.40 Being professionals, repeat offenders are
likely to be more sophisticated and calculating than other offenders; they are more
responsive to sanctions and also more inclined to take "precautions" (or avoidance
measures) to reduce the likelihood of conviction.41 Consequently, repeat offenders,
especially the most sophisticated ones, may take advantage of the DPP and try to
monitor their criminal activity in such a way that the prosecution could not provide
sufficient evidence with respect to each distinct crime. Heads of crime organizations
are good example of such repeat offenders. Under the DPP many of them are not even

ECON. LETTERs 89 (1980) (arguing that punishing repeat offenders more harshly increases
deterrence of offenders); Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci, A Simple Theory of Increasing
Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 1 REVIEW

OF

LAW

AND

ECONOMICS 71 (2005) (arguing that

repeat offenders should be punished more severely than other offenders, because of their
diminished employment opportunities); Winand Emons, A Note on the Optimal Punishment for
Repeat Offenders, 23 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
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that when punishment is fine, under certain conditions the optimal sanction scheme is
decreasing); Winand Emons, Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 27 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 170 (2007) (arguing that under certain condition increasing
sanctions for repeat offenders is optimal and under different conditions the opposite is true).
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brought to trial, let alone convicted. They know very well how to play according to
"the rules of the game", and the DPP allows them to do so. It is these kinds of
criminals who will be better deterred under the APP.

Another advantage of the APP is its cost-effectiveness. This costeffectiveness is the result of the fact that the marginal costs of providing evidence
targeted to prove a single specified offence increase. Suppose that under the DPP the
prosecution should bring ten items of evidence to satisfy the standard of proof for a
specific offence. It is typically much harder—and costly—to collect the tenth item of
evidence than the ninth item, the eighth item, and so on.42 Under the DPP the
prosecution should collect all ten items to get a conviction; under the APP, nine items
could be more than enough as long as the prosecution could bring one or more items
of evidence relating to other offences reasonably attributed to the defendant.
The conjecture that the marginal costs of evidence (targeted to convict a
person of a single offence) increase is not always true. Occasionally collecting the
tenth item of evidence for a single offence could be less costly than collecting the first
item for a different offence.43 But this does not undermine our claim, since the APP
gives the prosecution an option: either to collect the tenth item of evidence for the
original offence or else collect the first (or more) items for another offence. The
prosecution presumably will use this option efficiently and choose the less costly
course of action. The prosecution does not have such an option under the DPP.

IV Practical Objections
In this part we discuss several objections to the APP. These objections reflect
real concerns that should be taken seriously. Yet, it is shown below that none of the
objections provides a reason to reject the APP altogether. The awareness of the force
of these objections and the resulting modifications of our proposal contribute to the
understanding of the optimal scope of the doctrine.

42

Cite.

43

Cite.

24
A. Manipulations by the Prosecution
Arguably, the use of the APP is bound to lead to a large scale abuse.44 After
all, it is relatively easy to bring some evidence indicating the guilt of any person.
Consequently, under the APP, it would be possible to convict any person for some
offences without having significant evidence indicating his specific guilt. The
prosecution would find it very easy—too easy—to "tailor" accusations and abuse the
criminal process. If a person is accused of committing a certain offence and the
prosecution fails to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, it could easily collect
some evidence suggesting that the person performed a different offence with a low
degree of probability and thus overcoming the evidential hurdles for conviction.
This objection is not a reason to reject the APP, but, instead, to design it in a
way that will alleviate the concern of manipulation to a minimum. Recall that under
the principles of evidence law, a person cannot be convicted on the basis of statistical
evidence only.45 The APP does not change the rules of evidence. Consequently the
APP would bar the conviction of a driver for a violation of traffic regulations just
because all drivers commit such violations on a daily basis.46 In order to convict a
person, case specific evidence should be brought; otherwise conviction would be
impossible.
This may not fully alleviate this concern. In particular it does not preclude the
possibility of collecting pieces of low probability evidence designed to guarantee a
conviction. In order to prevent the abuse of the system by "tailoring" accusations, it is
possible to adopt "a minimum threshold" of case-specific evidence standard. Thus, for
example, a standard could be set such that only if the prosecution establishes that the
probability that the defendant committed the offence attributed to him is more than
50% (which is the preponderance of the evidence standard), then that probability will
be aggregated and could be used against the defendant. A minimal threshold of this
type would reduce the risks of abuse significantly since the risks of abuse are
particularly present when the threshold required for providing evidence is low.
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B. More Litigation
Another objection to the APP is that it is expected to trigger massive
litigation. This seems to be a natural consequence of the fact that under the APP
courts are required to consider even relatively low probability offences in order to
determine liability. That would encourage the prosecution—so the objection goes—to
bring as much evidence as it can reasonably get with respect to any seemingly
criminal behavior of the defendant in order to convince the court at the end that the
defendant is guilty at least in one offence. It follows therefore that the APP would
generate much more litigation and would increase the costs of the criminal law
system.
While more litigation is likely to be generated by the APP, we believe it is not
a serious concern for two reasons. First, if a minimal threshold that precludes courts
from aggregating low probabilities offences is adopted, as we suggested above, then
the increase in litigation would be mitigated.
Second, even though the APP triggers more litigation, it is likely that the
quantity of evidence necessary on average for one conviction would decrease under
the APP, with a resulting decrease in the volume of litigation per conviction. As was
explained in Part III, under the APP the costs of collecting evidence for one
conviction would be on average lower than under the DPP.47 But sometimes it is not
only the costs of collecting the evidence which increase but also the quantity of the
evidence and the time spent of litigating it. Take the quantity of evidence necessary to
convince a court that the probability of guilt is not only 90% but 95%. This quantity is
expected to be larger on average than what is necessary to convince a court that the
probability of guilt is not only 45% but 50%. The simple intuition here is as follows:
since it is more costly, on average, to bring the last item of evidence relating to one
offence than the first item of evidence relating to another offence, it is expected that
the prosecution, in order to economize on its costs, would try to substitute this costly
item with the less costly evidence. Third, and most important, it is not frivolous
litigation which the APP triggers. On the contrary, more litigation under the APP
would result in a correlative increase of justified convictions and better enforcement
of the law.
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C. Interdependence of Offences
On many occasions the evidence provided to prove one offence is not
independent of the evidence provided to prove another offence. Often such
interdependence is hidden, and, consequently, adopting the APP would generate too
many false convictions.
To better understand this objection let us return to Example 1. This example
assumes that there is no interdependence between the four charges brought against the
defendant. Indeed, the easiest case for applying the APP is the one where the actions
attributed to the defendant are independent of each other, as well as the evidence
relating to each of these actions. When the offences are not independent, a simple
aggregation of the probabilities will result in too many false convictions. Suppose for
example that someone is accused of four separate offences of sexual assaults, all
committed against the same victim. In each case, if examined separately, the evidence
indicates a probability of .9 that the defendant is guilty.
Assume now that there is a probability of .1—which is sufficient for
acquittal—that the victim fabricated one accusation against the defendant in order to
retaliate against him.48 Obviously the probabilities that the four offenses were
committed are interdependent: if the victim plotted against the defendant with respect
to one offence she would be more likely to have done it a second time and a third
time, and so forth. In other words, if she plotted against the defendant with respect to
one offence, it significantly increases the chances that she did it with respect to other
offences. This is not to say that under certain circumstances the evidence with respect
to all four charges could not convince the court that at least one offence, and even
more, was committed by the defendant; but courts should be very cautious in such
cases in aggregating the probabilities.
In the sexual assault example the interdependence is obvious and courts are
expected therefore to take it into account. But, at other times, the interdependence is
hidden, and, consequently the risk of too many false convictions is even more
substantial given that courts may be oblivious to it.
Suppose a driver is detected five times for speeding by the same radar, and
that the radar's average rate of error is .75. Assume now that the radar's rate of error is
much larger in the evenings than in the mornings, say, because it is calibrated every
48
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night, and, assume also, that the rate of error is especially high with respect to bright
color cars. If our driver was detected five times in the evenings and his car was of a
bright color, and assuming the court is unaware of the radar's defects, aggregating the
probabilities could create too high risk of false convictions.
We don’t think that the risk of hidden interdependence provides a conclusive
reason to reject the APP. Instead, courts should be aware of it and require sufficient
evidence to rebut its existence before applying the APP. Furthermore, given
awareness to the problem of hidden interdependence, the APP, if adopted, would
trigger research and generate information concerning the possible interdependence.49
D. Difficulties of Implementation
Applying the APP could be hard. Courts could make mistakes and apply it
wrongly. One possible mistake was discussed in the previous section: a court could
aggregate interdependent probabilities as if they were independent ones. But even
without that, applying the APP presupposes courts' knowledge of the probabilities
relating to each offence, while in fact courts do not possess such knowledge. To be
sure, under the DPP courts should be able to judge whether the standard of "beyond a
reasonable doubt" was satisfied or not, and their judgment has at least some
probabilistic feature;50 but they are not required to ascribe accurate probabilities to
their finding on that matter. Finally, applying the APP across trials is even harder.
Here the court of trial B should get accurate information about the probability of the
defendant's guilt in Trial A, either if the defendant was convicted at Trial A or
acquitted. This puts an unreasonable burden on both courts A and B.
This objection is a convincing one as long as it relates to aggregating
probabilities across different trials. But it should not be a reason not to apply the APP
across different offences in the same trial. Indeed, a court which applies the APP
should look also at the "general picture", namely at all charges, and not only at each
offence separately. The court is not required under the APP to ascribe precise
probabilities to each offence.
To establish what the APP requires of courts, compare it to the DPP. Under
the DPP courts are asked to examine whether there is sufficient evidence that the
49
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defendant committed offence A, or sufficient evidence that he committed offence B or
sufficient evidence that he committed offence C and convict the person of one of
these offences only if there is sufficient evidence that this particular offence was
committed. In contrast under the APP the court should address the question whether
there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed one of these three offences.51
Thus, under the APP a court could conclude in a certain trial, that even though it
cannot convict the defendant for the commission of any specific offence, it can
convict him of the commission of one indeterminate offence (or more) because there
is no reasonable doubt that he committed one offence (or more).
E. Redundancy
Last, it could be argued that the APP is already being used by courts even if
only implicitly and there is no need to recognize it explicitly. Moreover, if courts
apply it implicitly, forcing them to apply it explicitly may result in double counting.
According to this objection, when several charges are made against the defendant, the
judge, and certainly the jury are influenced by the accumulation of the charges and
tend to convict more easily than if there was only one charge.
It is hard to tell whether the assumption that courts and jury are influenced by
the accumulation of charges is empirically right or wrong.52 At least with respect to
judges, it may be the case that judges are committed to examine each charge
separately and not to be influenced by the plurality of charges. The prevailing legal
ethos does not allow considerations of the type examined above. To the extent that
judges inculcate this ethos, it follows that judges are likely to consciously reject the
very possibility of aggregating probabilities.
But even if sometimes courts really apply a rule which is similar to the APP,
it is better to do so explicitly and systematically, rather than implicitly and randomly.
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Furthermore, the application of the APP could sometimes be complicated and hard,
and it is better to deal with it in a straightforward way instead of leaving it to judges
and jurors' rough and sometimes inconsistent intuitions.

Even if judges do not apply the APP, it is possible that police and prosecution
apply a version of the APP in making decisions to bring defendants to trial and to
enforce the law. According to this argument, when the police and prosecution get
evidence related to different offences allegedly committed by the same person, they
are more likely to bring him to trial,53 and more importantly, they try harder to collect
more evidence thereby increasing the chances of conviction.54
Even though we believe that the APP may already be used by the police and
prosecution, we do not think this is a reason for courts not to apply the APP. First, if
courts refuse to apply the APP it certainly influences the prosecution's decisions not to
charge suspects even if by aggregating the probabilities they are convinced that a
specific person is guilty of an offence. Under such a scheme, the prosecutors know
that as long as they are unable to establish that the defendant committed a specific
offence the court will apply the DPP and acquit the defendant. Second, even if the
police and prosecution increase their enforcement efforts directed at a person against
whom there is enough evidence for conviction under the APP but not under the DPP,
it is not clear why courts should not apply the APP. By refusing to adopt the APP,
courts encourage the prosecution to incur excessive costs for enforcement;55
furthermore, on many occasions the police and prosecution will not bring sufficient
evidence for conviction under the DPP even if under the APP conviction is
warranted—either because the costs of collecting more evidence is prohibitively high,
or because such evidence is impossible to collect.
Finally, it could be argued that at least in plea bargains the APP is in fact
applied: when there are several accusations against the defendant, and even when
none of them passes the threshold necessary for convictions, the aggregation of the
probabilities would influence the bargain between the prosecution and the
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defendant.56 Even if that is right, we do not see why courts should not apply the APP.
As we have already explained in the previous paragraph, the prosecution acts in the
shadow of the prospective trial. Therefore, if the APP is not applied by courts, it
certainly affects plea bargains, though not in the right direction. Furthermore, even if
the APP was perfectly applied through pleas bargains, still it provides no reason why
it should not be applied by courts as well.

V Retributivist and Expressivist Theories of Punishment
So far, we have established that deterrence-based theories, in particular
theories which focus on efficiency, would probably endorse a moderate version of
APP. It is time now to examine justice-based theories. Our primary claim is that
different justice-based theories of punishment may endorse different views concerning
the APP. To do so we discuss two types of justice-based theories: Kantian theories
and expressivist theories of punishment. We argue that the former type of theory is
likely to be more sympathetic to the APP than the latter.
Kant maintains that, "[p]unishment by a court . . . can never be inflicted
merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil
society. It must always be inflicted upon him only because he has committed a
crime."57 This observation provides the basis for many retributivist theories. The basic
observation maintained by retributivists is that wrongdoers ought to be made to suffer
in proportion to their offence.58 Criminals, under this view, simply deserve to be
punished and, furthermore, their desert provides reasons to inflict punishment upon
them. As Thomas Hill explains, this view implies that “acts of a certain kind have as
an intrinsic property that it is fit, appropriate or called for that the perpetrator suffer
for it“.59 Hence, if we establish that an agent performed a wrong, we have a reason to
inflict a sanction on that person even if the nature of the wrong is left unspecified
since the person clearly deserves to be punished.
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In

contrast

expressivists

emphasize

expressive,

educational

and

communicative aspects of criminal sanctions ("EEC theories"). Under such views
sanctioning a person is a public manifestation of condemnation and disapprobation of
his deeds. Some believe that condemnation and disapprobation is sufficient in itself to
justify the infliction of criminal sanctions (expressive theories) while others believe
that condemnation and disapprobation are conducive to other goals such as education
or the inducement of guilt.
Robert Nozick falls into the former camp. Nozick believes that ”[r]etributive
punishment is an act of communicative behavior.”60 In elaborating on the concept of
communicative behavior, Nozick speaks of retributive principles as encompassing
two aspects. The first is to "connect the wrongdoer to value qua value" and the second
is to connect it in a way "that the value qua value has a significant effect in . . . [the
criminal's] life, as significant as his own flouting of correct values."61 Similarly Joel
Feinberg believes that: “punishment is a conventional device for the expression of
attitudes, resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and
reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose
name’ the punishment is inflicted.“62 Jean Hampton shifts attention to educational
concerns. In her view, "punishment is intended as a way of teaching the wrongdoer
that the action she did (or wants to do) is forbidden because it is morally wrong and
should not be done for that reason."63
Although EEC theories do not have to reject the APP, they seem likely to do
so. After all, these theories highlight the condemnation or disapproval of an act, and it
is a prerequisite for conveyance of condemnation and disapproval of an act to identify
the object of condemnation and disapproval, that is, to identify unambiguously the act
that it being condemned.64 Punishing a person for an offence she may or may not have
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committed (simply because it is evident that she committed either this offence or a
more serious one) rather than for the offence she committed dilutes the important
expressive, educational or communicative message that the deed performed by the
person is wrong. Hence, the APP would probably be rejected (or at least unlimited
version of the APP) because no specific act can be attributed to the individual and,
consequently, no act can be effectively condemned. To condemn a person for a bad
deed he committed or to condemn a person for an act which forms part of a
disjunction of acts is not to condemn a specific act. It is instead closer to
condemnation of the person as such for having done a bad deed than a condemnation
of an act.
The rejection of the APP by the expressivist theorists is not an accident. It is
based on the way these theories address what seems to be an evident weakness of
these theories. Expressivist, educational and communicative theories are always open
to the accusation that to condemn theft, rape or murder, it is not necessary to inflict
sanctions on the perpetrator.65 To address this objection, these theories claim that
punishment is a special mode of expression—one that is concrete rather than abstract;
one that is designed to express disapproval of a particular act that was performed by
the perpetrator rather than towards an evil act which may or may not have committed
by him. Evidence for this requirement for specificity is ample in these theories.
Hence, for instance, according to Hampton, the punisher needs "to communicate to
the wrongdoer that her victims suffered . . . so that the wrongdoer can appreciate the
harmfulness of her action."66 Feinberg also asserts that "punishment surely expresses
the community's strong disapproval of what the criminal did."67 Communicating
disapproval by punishing an individual for a disjunction of acts does not satisfy the
specificity of expression required by these theories.
Advocates of the APP could dispute this claim and argue that by endorsing
the APP, punishment conveys a disapproval of all offences which constitute the
disjunction. Arguably, the conviction in such cases can be based only on disapproval
and condemnation of all offences included in the disjunction because without such a
global condemnation, the person must be acquitted. Thus, ironically it seems that the
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APP is even more effective in expressing or conveying disapproval than the DPP
because it conveys the message that all the offences included in the disjunction are
wrong.
This objection fails to appreciate the subtlety of the concerns raised by
expressivist, educational and communicative theories. It fails to capture the
significance of the condemnation of a concrete act—the very act that has been
perpetrated by the criminal—rather than the condemnation of hypothetical
components of a disjunction some of which may not have been committed by the
agent. Concrete condemnation is condemnation which stresses the hideousness of an
actual act performed by the defendant: murder, rape, theft or fraud rather than merely
a crime deserving a sentence of at least ten years such as murder or rape or theft or
fraud or even the condemnation of both robbery and murder when only one can be
attributed to the perpetrator.
To sum up, different justice-based theories take different attitudes towards the
APP. While traditional retributivist theories are likely to be sympathetic to the APP,
expressivist theories are likely to be more suspicious towards it. Perhaps this fact
explains the intuitive reluctance on the part of criminal law theorists and practitioners
to implement it in practice.
When, if ever, should the APP be recognized and give rise to a conviction?
Under retributivism (as described above) the answer is that APP should be applied
with no limits. In contrast, under EEC theories the answer is more delicate. It depends
on the question of whether using the APP will effectively serve the expressive,
educational and communicative functions of criminal law. We shall argue that the
more similar two offences are, the more likely the APP can be used without
frustrating the expressive, educational and communicative functions attributed by
theorists to criminal law. In contrast the more different the offences are, the greater
the willingness of advocates of these theories to use the DPP.
As a start let us examine the nature of the offence. To establish the relevance
of the nature of the offence, assume that it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that a person committed either a murder or a theft but it cannot be established that he
committed any one of them. 68 The fact that the offences are so different and that one
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is classified as an offence against the body while the other is classified as a property
offence seems sufficient to substantiate the conclusion that the person ought not to be
convicted. The concern in this case is a concern that has been acknowledged by some
writers as the concern for “fair labeling.” The concern for fair labeling is the concern
that “offenders ought to be labeled with an adequate degree of precision, in order that
the criminal record identifies the gist of . . . [the offender’s] criminal wrongdoing.” 69
It would also seem implausible under EEC theories to convict a person who
committed one of two unrelated fraud offences. If the police can prove that a
defendant committed either a fraud on one occasion or an unrelated fraud committed
on another occasion, the defendant, most likely, should be acquitted. This case
establishes the relevance of a second important dimension for EEC theories: the
homogeneity or heterogeneity of the offences. The two offences are classified as fraud
offences. But, despite their formal similarity, no two fraud offences are identical. The
nature and severity of fraud offences is always colored by the particular
circumstances: the sum of money, the identity of the victim, and so forth.
Heterogeneity makes it more difficult to express concrete condemnation of the act
performed by the defendant since the disjunction of the offences consists of very
different actions.
Yet, there are circumstances under which the heterogeneity of the
circumstances should not bar conviction under the expressive, educational and
communicative theories. Assume that two bank officials have committed a series of
(unrelated) frauds against a single bank at the same period. It can be proven beyond
reasonable doubt that one official has committed a series of frauds against the bank
and stole $100,000, while the second official committed a series of frauds against the
bank and stole $200,000, but it cannot be established who committed each one of the
series of frauds. It seems in this case that the similarity in the circumstances is
sufficient to make the condemnation of both offenders concrete enough and to convey
a clear and concrete disapproval of the behavior. A dimension which seems to be
relevant in this case is the identity of the victim of the offence. If it can be established
between the probabilities. In this case the probability that the defendant committed either
murder or theft is .99. Assuming for example that .95 is considered by the law to be sufficient
for conviction the question is whether to convict the defendant by applying the APP.
69

See A P. Simester & G R Sullivan On the Nature and Rationale of Property Offences in R.A.
Duff & Stuart Green, Defining Crimes 186 (2005).

35
that several offences were committed against a particular victim, and, in addition, it
can be established that the circumstances under which they were committed were
identical, then EEC theories could endorse the use of the APP even if it cannot be
established which was exactly the offence committed by the defendant.

Conclusion
This paper raises a challenge to a prevailing practice governing criminal law.
While all theorists and practitioners reject the use of the APP, deterrence-based
considerations support its adoption. Although practicalities may limit the optimal
scope of the APP, a moderate version of the APP can promote deterrence and be
immune to abuse. We have also observed that justice-based considerations endorse
different views concerning the APP. The retributivist theories would endorse
aggregation across offences while expressivist theories would be less inclined to do
so. Expressivist concerns suggest that the sentence should reflect a disapproval of an
act and that that act should be identified such that disapproval of it would be
sufficiently concrete. It is perhaps the expressivist concerns which explain why the
APP is universally rejected by criminal law theorists and practitioners. These
concerns could also explain why in cases where deterrence seems to be the underlying
theory—such as in regulatory offences—the APP has greater appeal than in other
cases.
This paper is ultimately the byproduct of an enigma. It is founded on an
observation that the practice of law seems to reject offhand and categorically what
simple and common-sense reason seems to endorse categorically, namely the APP.
While in general the practice of law is wiser than theorists can imagine, it may
sometimes err in its judgments. We believe that this is one of these rare cases and
consequently we believe that the practice of law should endorse (in a limited way) the
APP. The scope of endorsement is constrained by both practical limitations as well on
principled expressivist concerns.
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